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This paper is a brief review of current problems in which trade and environmental issues
intersect.  After a statement of these problems, it focuses on some recent empirical research and
future research needs of special relevance to agricultural economists.
In the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), environmental issues have been
particularly salient in the last several years, prompting special reports (GATT; Anderson and
Blackhurst), and a rejuvenated GATT working group on the subject (see Pearson; OTA).  The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has formed a joint committee
on trade and environment, and has commissioned a variety of sector papers, including one on
agriculture (Runge).  The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) has
also initiated work in the area. 
What are the Issues?
Three main issues dominate the trade/environment debate.  The first is the potential
environmental impact of trade liberalization, both in the regional context of NAFTA and in the
global trade talks in GATT.  The second is the possible use of environmental measures as
nontariff barriers to trade.  The third is the relationship between trade agreements under NAFTA
and GATT and the variety of international agreements affecting the environment, such as the
Montreal Protocol agreement to protect atmospheric ozone.
First is the concern that trade liberalization, whether in NAFTA or GATT, will lead to
increased levels of environmental damages.  There are at least three aspects of this concern, which
has been expressed strongly by a variety of environmental groups and members of Congress. 
Simply by raising the scale of economic activity, more open trade may lead to levels of investment2
and consumption that put additional pressure on scarce natural resources, and increase levels of
industrial pollution.  Some also argue that differences in environmental standards, especially
between North and South, will create "pollution havens" for firms and industries seeking less
regulatory oversight.  Finally, the proposed harmonization of environmental standards is argued to
lead to a "lowest common denominator," in which higher levels of environmental protection are
sacrificed in the name of competitiveness.
In contrast to the environmental community's concern over the impacts of more liberal
trade, those most directly involved in trade negotiations tend to focus on a second issue:  the
potential for protectionism disguised as environmental protection.  In North/North trade relations,
this can occur when a country or trading bloc protects internal markets in the name of
environmental health or safety, such as the European Community's (EC) decision to ban the
import of beef from cattle treated with certain growth hormones.  In North/South trade relations,
it can occur when higher levels of environmental standards are used to bar market access to goods
and services produced under lower levels of regulation in the South.  The fundamental issue
concerns the ability to distinguish legitimate environmental measures, which may well distort
trade, from those which are not only trade distorting but have little basis from an environmental
standpoint.  Developing such criteria involves complex legal, scientific and institutional issues.
The third issue is a hybrid of the first two.  In the last decade, a variety of new multilateral
agreements have been negotiated in response to global environmental challenges such as ozone
depletion, species extinction, protection of Antarctica, and international management of the
oceans.  The Rio Conference on Environment and Development, held in June, 1992, resulted in a
broad new mandate for environmental action, Agenda 21, together with the creation of a new3
U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development.  Some of these agreements call on their
signatories to refrain from trade in certain goods or processes.  In the recently completed NAFTA
negotiations, for example, a trinational commission on environment was created with dispute
settlement authority apparently independent of GATT law.  How are these accords to be balanced
with existing or new trade obligations under GATT?  Should they be exempted from national
treatment and/or non-discrimination requirements?  What body of international law, and which
international institutions, should exercise authority over the intersection between multilateral
environmental and trade policy?
These issues play out along two different axes:  the first is trade relations in the North,
especially between the United States, the European Community and Japan.  In some respects, the
high income countries of the North are increasingly alike in placing relatively high value on
environmental quality.  But these economies are also locked in a high stakes game of competition
for global markets, and their governments face domestic pressures to loosen regulatory oversight.
The second axis is the gap between environmental regulations in the North and South.  This
gap is clearly much wider, accentuating problems of harmonization and concerns over "pollution
havens" and competitiveness.  The NAFTA negotiations reflect these differences in microcosm,
with Mexico attempting rapidly to upgrade its environmental regulations in order to satisfy fears
in the U.S. and Canada.  From the perspective of the North, these fears include lower costs of
environmental compliance by competitors in the South; movement of firms and industries into
these low-regulation areas; the import of goods (such as fruits and vegetables) tainted by
treatments banned in the North for environmental reasons; and the use of production methods in
the South (such as tuna fishing with nets that also kill dolphins) objectionable to environmental4
interests.  Yet for many in the South, the environmental regulations adopted in the North, even if
desirable, may be unaffordable.  In addition, many developing countries suspect the North of
using its higher standards to discriminate against the products and processes of the South
primarily for trade rather than environmental reasons.
These issues pose special challenges for agriculture in research and public policy.  While the
second and third issues will be a long-term focus of GATT and government activity, it is the first
issue that is currently in the spotlight.  What are the likely environmental impacts of trade
liberalization under GATT, especially in agriculture?  The empirical base in this area is thin, and
trade/environment interactions are poorly understood, and only recently have been subjected to
study.
Agriculture:  The Theoretical and Empirical Base
Since almost all agricultural trade policies emanate from domestic price manipulation
(Johnson), the same domestic policies in the name of which trade is distorted also appear
responsible for a large share of the environmental damages in agriculture (Runge).  Of course,
even if reforms which reduced producer subsidies were undertaken, high commodity prices arising
from the market could lead to environmental stress on land and water resources.  While domestic
and trade policy reforms are not likely to be sufficient to address a variety of environmental
problems in agriculture, they are nonetheless necessary if these market failures are to be
confronted.  Such measures would appear to work in the same direction as more targeted
environmental interventions, but the evidence in support of this view has yet to be convincingly
marshalled.5
In light of the many assertions that agricultural trade liberalization will benefit the
environment,  empirical examination of these effects was undertaken in a cross-country study of
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fertilizer use and the potential impacts of trade liberalization by the first author (Harold).  She
tested the basic empirical relationship between the intensity of agricultural production, as
measured by fertilizer use per hectare, and the level of producer subsidies, which is at the heart of
claims that reductions in these subsidies will lead to environmental improvements.  While only a
beginning, its basic results support the general claim of environmental improvements from
reduced producer subsidies.
The study focused on achieving a modest decrease in the level of agricultural support in
countries with highly protected agricultural sectors.  The aggregate level of support was measured
using Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), an indicator of the value of the transfers from domestic
consumers and taxpayers to producers resulting from a given set of agricultural policies, at a point
in time.  Although the PSE does not provide an exact measure of the level of protection provided
by government intervention, nor does it indicate the impact of government policies on production
or trade, both the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Webb, Lopez and Penn) and the OECD have
estimated PSEs for a large number of countries.
Explanation of Variables.  Data were collected over six years for forty countries in the
model.  The dependent variable (FCONS) is total fertilizer use for nitrogen, phosphorous and
potassium fertilizer per hectare of arable land and permanent cropland.  Permanent pasture and
grazing lands are not included.
The general equation used to calculate PSEs was somewhat different from the aggregate
PSEs calculated by OECD and ERS.  Livestock products are excluded, to better captureFCONS ’ µit % µ1PSEit % µ2PCGDPit % µ3PCGDP2 % µ4PPCORNit
% µ5PPRICEit % µ6PPWHEATit % eit, i’1...40, t’1...6
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agricultural policy distortions on fertilizer use, since livestock production does not use fertilizer
directly.  The livestock industry obviously influences the demand for feed crops, which leads to
more demand for fertilizer, but the use of fertilizer for feed crops is captured in the adapted PSE. 
While the demand for fertilizer depends in part on its own demand in the previous period
and on the expected price of a crop in the next period, a consistent fertilizer price series (or even a
good price proxy from other variables) was not available.  The expected PSE for the following
year could also affect fertilizer use, but this variable was not considered.
Other factors that might be expected to influence the use of fertilizer are: the per capita
gross domestic product (PCGDP) and the producer prices of wheat, corn and rice (PPWHEAT,
PPCORN, PPRICE, respectively).  Per capita GDP is expected to affect fertilizer consumption
positively, since richer countries can purchase more fertilizer.  A  quadratic specification was
suggested by Tobey and Cook, based on an Income Transition Hypothesis of an inverted u-
shaped income curve with respect to demands for environmental services (World Bank).  Theory
implies that the coefficient on GDP should be positive and the square of GDP should be negative,
as aggregate fertilizer use increases to a maximum and then declines as environmental concerns
begin to constrain its use.
Results of regression analysis.  The model estimated is a pooled cross-section time series:
The error term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed, with zero mean and
constant variance.  Table 1 summarizes the results.  Descriptive statistics, covariance and
correlation matrices and regression output are available from the authors.  The model has a7
constant slope coefficient and intercepts that vary over countries and time.  The estimated
coefficient on PSE, 15.4, is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.  A one unit increase
in the producer subsidy equivalent across all countries would lead to a 15.4 kilogram per hectare
per year increase in commercial fertilizer use.  Thus, the intensity of fertilizer use would decline if
trade liberalization occurred, provided a drop in the PSE were to accompany the liberalization.
To put this in perspective, consider the impact on fertilizer use in the Netherlands, the
country with the highest rate of fertilizer use per hectare in the data set.  In the Netherlands on
average from 1982 to 1987, commercial fertilizer applications were 765.5 kilograms per hectare
per year.  If the PSE in the Netherlands (approximately 39 percent for that time period) dropped
by one point, then the model predicts that fertilizer would show a negligible decrease.  However,
if the PSE dropped by 15 points, a plausible level if the GATT negotiations are successful,
fertilizer would decrease by 231 kilograms per hectare per year.  Currently the Netherlands has
problems with excess fertilizer use.  A drop to 534.5 kilograms/hectare/year is not enough to
eliminate environmental damages, since the crop needs on arable land are only 160 (180)
kilograms per hectare per year for clay (sand) (Dietz).  However, in countries where fertilizer is
being used only marginally in "excess", the resulting drop in use may reduce pollution
significantly.  This example illustrates that the drop in fertilizer consumption per hectare could be
substantial, depending on the amount of the PSE change. 
PCGDP and PCGDP  are both significant at the 0.1 level and consistent with the Income
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Transformation Hypothesis.  Per capita gross domestic product in a country affects fertilizer
intensity positively to a certain level of per capita GDP (to $13,287 on average for all countries),
and negatively thereafter.8
Corn and rice commodity prices are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but they
showed negative coefficients (the producer price of wheat was not significant).  The higher the
producer price of corn and rice, the lower the fertilizer intensity.  This conflicts with the notion
that higher producer support prices cause more intensive fertilizer use.  There could be a missing
variable that biases the results in this specification, causing a negative sign, or there could be
problems with the price data themselves.
To examine the major linkage of interest, FCONS is regressed on PSE alone.  The
coefficient on PSE is significant 0.01) and is only slightly different from that in the original model
(14.74).  This smaller model helps to buttress the conclusion that there is a strong relationship
between agricultural support, as measured by the PSE, and fertilizer use, regardless of price and
country development levels.
Future Research Issues in Agricultural Economics
Clearly, studies such as reported here require replication, expansion, and improvement. 
Continuing to focus on fertilizer, whether trade liberalization benefits the environment depends on
specific linkages:  (1) trade liberalization leads to a drop in producer subsidies in countries with
heavily subsidized agricultural sectors (the same countries that use fertilizer and other potential
pollutants intensively); (2) a drop in subsidies causes producers in these countries to produce less; (3)
this is achieved by decreasing the intensity of non-land inputs; since fertilizer is an important input, if
production decreases, the use of fertilizer should also decrease; (4) since fertilizer contributes to
degradation of the environment, a drop in its use would benefit the environment.  There is a critical
need to examine each of these linkages in order to further the policy debate.9
With respect to the first linkages, the "Dunkel draft" reform proposal will allow countries to
meet required reductions in agricultural support in many ways; the PSE measurement includes
anything from machinery and fertilizer subsidies to crop payments to producers.  Different approaches
can be more or less targeted to reduce intensity of production.
With respect to the second linkage, subsidy decreases could lead to a drop, a shift or an
increase in production.  Among the possible consequences:  (1) a producer could shift production
from one crop to another; (2) production could shift from one country (or a group of countries) to
others; (3) land could be sold to other agricultural producers; or (4) land could be sold for non-
agricultural purposes.  Each effect has implications for fertilizer use.  The expected net effect of these
four changes, which is what is estimated by most trade models, is that aggregate agricultural
production will decline, and with it input use, establishing the third linkage.  This depends in part
upon the elasticity of substitution between inputs.  For land and fertilizer, Binswanger estimates the
partial elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and land to be 2.98: land is a substitute for fertilizer
(Binswanger).  The only empirical evidence that fertilizer use might fall with trade liberalization
comes from Abler and Shortle for the EC.  The Abler and Shortle model estimates the change in
production and fertilizer use by the elimination of commodity programs in the U.S. and the EC.  They
estimate a –7.3 percent medium term decrease in chemical use in the EC but a 6 percent increase in
the U.S.  This provides only mixed support for the contention that falling subsidies cause fertilizer use
to drop.
Finally, whether a decrease in fertilizer use leads to an improvement in the environment is also
in need of more careful research.  While it is widely agreed that agriculture contributes to
environmental pollution, some researchers remain tentative about the link between fertilizer use and10
the environment (e.g., Dubgaard; Taylor and Frohberg; Duffy, et al.).  Part of the uncertainty can be
attributed to the time it takes for farm chemicals to reach groundwater.  Some researchers estimate it
takes 25 years or more, so the impacts of the post-war rapid growth in farm chemical use may just
now be beginning to emerge.  While trade liberalization may reduce the aggregate use of fertilizer, the
intensity of use is a better indicator of "excessive" applications with harmful environmental impacts. 
This should be the focus of future research.  Because trade reform policies are not primarily aimed at
environmental targets, trade liberalization per se is not a sufficient response to environmental
problems in agriculture (Anderson; Runge).  Agreement on trade targets and instruments does not
imply that necessary environmental regulatory actions in agriculture will be undertaken.11
Notes
1.  See Anderson (1992); Koopmans (1987); and Runge (1992).12
Table 1.  Panel data linear regression problem
Dependent variable:  FCONS = commercial fertilizer use per hectare
Significant
at 95th Standard
Explanation of Ind. Variables percentile Coefficient Error
PSE Producer subsidy  yes 15.36 7.28
equivalent
PCGDP Per capita GDP yes 0.029 0.0098
PCGDP2 Per capita GDP squared yes –0.000001 0.0000
PPCORN Producer price for corn yes –0.0933 0.0374
PPRICE Producer price for rice yes –0.0456 0.0227
PPWHEAT Producer price for wheat no 0.0595 0.0334
R  = .992 No. of observations = 240
2
Adjusted R  = .9908 Degrees of freedom = 239
213
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